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What constitutes an individual ‘right’ under EU law? Although this is as much of a central ques-
tion for the constitutional and administrative system of the EU, as it is for every other legal 
system, there is surprisingly little conceptual clarity or structural guiding approach. Six decades 
of case law of the CJEU and of development of the EU’s legal system have not put an end to a 
great diversity in approaches to applying EU law. This article discusses various conceptions of 
individual rights under EU law and presents a model allowing for consistent interpretation and 
application of EU legal acts by Union bodies as well as by Member States legislatures, admin-
istrations and courts. It thereby aims at offering a systematic approach to identifying the source, 
scope and possible limitation of the notion of individual rights under EU law, in view of great 
legal uncertainty given diverging interpretation of rights by national courts and scholars as well 
as voices from within the CJEU.  
In order to do so, the article revisits the basics of the notion of an individual right in EU law as 
developed in the early case law of the CJEU on direct effect, of effective judicial protection and 
to damages. The notion of an individual right under EU law is not only an important preliminary 
issue in the context of the right to an effective judicial remedy but is also a key component for 
identifying a right to damages for violations of EU law. Beyond this, the concept of an individual 
right is also important for defining legal relations in the multi-level legal system as it defines and 
delimits of the scope of the possible direct effect of EU law in its Member States. This article 
also looks at the notion of protected interests and whether the introduction of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR)2 as binding law by the Treaty of Lisbon, and of a distinc-
tion between rights and principles in this instrument, has challenged the established model of 
individual rights. It then discusses how the various elements can fit together and addresses the 
problem of enforceability. 
A The basic case law  
The concept of an individual right under EU law, its sources and the approach to identifying the 
scope of a right have been developed by the case law of the CJEU since the early days of its case 
law developing the possibilities of direct effect of EU law in Member State legal systems. The 
concept of protecting individual rights has thereby been important to ensure both effectiveness 
and legitimacy of EU law. In this context, individual rights were developed inter alia as an instru-
ment of enforcing obligations. This was especially relevant in times in which the Union had no 
explicit constitutional Charter of Fundamental Rights. Deriving individual rights from obligations 
filled the gap in a legally coherent manner and ensured at the same time, that identifying rights 
under EU law would not lead to a ‘competence creep’ in that identifying individual rights would 
not at the same time open up new legal basis for EU powers. This is an ongoing concern, which 
                                                 
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2012 C326/02. 
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has led to the current Article 51(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR)3 and 
the repeated reaffirmations of this in the case law of the CJEU.4 
The concept of individual rights in EU law was developed since the earliest cases of the CJEU 
not only as rights to challenge acts of EU institutions, but also to challenge acts of Member States 
as well as to apply between individuals. Three seminal cases in the development of EU law illus-
trate this understanding: 
I Individual rights in disputes with EU institutions and bodies 
As early as 1956, in Algera,5 the CJEU developed the notion of individual rights of employees of 
the ‘Common Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community (now the European Par-
liament) to challenge the legality of acts of the Common Assembly, which had a negative effect 
on their remuneration and employment situation. In absence of positive Union law governing 
the situation, the court identified the nature, extent and limits of the employees’ individual rights 
by identifying, on the basis of a comparison between the legal systems of the six founding Mem-
ber States, the obligations of the Common Assembly to protect and respect the legitimate inter-
ests of individuals.6 It was the existence of public obligations, on one hand, and individual inter-
ests in need of protection on the other, that led the CJEU to develop the individual rights to be 
protected under Union law. 
II Direct effect of EU law and rights arising from Member State obligations 
This approach of deriving individual rights from obligations was confirmed and developed in the 
famous case Van Gend en Loos which was decisive in the constitutionalisation of EU law by laying 
the very foundations the relation between EU law and the Member States legal systems. Van 
Gend en Loos is methodologically important because it confirmed the link between, on the one 
hand, obligations of public authorities, with, on the other hand, the individual rights. This has 
been ever since a distinctive feature of EU law.7  
                                                 
3 “The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new 
power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” 
4 Judgment of 7 May 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105 paras 19-23;. Judgment of 1 December 2016, Daouidi, 
C-395/15, EU:C:2016:917, para 63; Judgment of 25 May 2016, Meroni, C-559/14, EU:C:2016:349, para 43; Judgment of 6 
October 2015, Delvigne, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paras 25-27; Judgment of 11 November 2014, Dano, C-333/13, 
EU:C:2014:2358, para 88. 
5 Judgment of 12 July 1957, Algera and Others v Assemblée Commune, Joined cases C-7/56 and 3-7/57, C:1957:7. 
6 Judgment of 12 July 1957, Algera and Others v Assemblée Commune, Joined cases C-7/56 and 3-7/57, C:1957:7 at p. 54. It found 
that ‘[u]nless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference to the rules acknowledged 
by the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the member countries.’ 
7 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy’ (2014) 12 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 94. 
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In Van Gend en Loos the Court held that, given the telos of the Treaty, individual rights exist not 
only where they are expressly granted by EC law, but “also by reason of obligations which the 
Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and 
upon the institutions of the Community.”8 The Court thus focused on the nature of the obliga-
tion arising from European law and not only on the wording of the law. Since the wording of the 
relevant Treaty article (then Article 12 EEC) “contains a clear and unconditional prohibition… 
ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member States and 
their subjects,”9 the Court identified an individual right arising from a precisely formulated neg-
ative obligation of the Member State in EU law which was to be protected by national courts.10  
The CJEU further explicitly recognises, that the functioning of the Common Market is ‘‘of direct 
concern to interested parties’’, implicitly acknowledging that Van Gend en Loos had an individual 
interest in challenging the Member State violation of its obligation not to increase import duties.11 
It notes the link between individual rights and effective enforcement of EU law in that “the 
vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision” of 
compliance of Member States with EU law.12  
III Rights arising from EU law obligations in disputes between individuals 
Van Gend en Loos had also confirmed a third context in which individual rights could arise from 
clear and precise obligations under EU law. In Van Gend en Loos the CJEU had stated that these 
should also be enforceable “in actions between individuals before a national court” where indi-
viduals could plead “infringements of those obligations”.13 Defrenne II14 is the most famous ex-
ample of this where the CJEU found that (what was then) Article 119 EEC15 stating the principle 
                                                 
8 Judgment of 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 12. 
9 Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 13 ("The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and 
unconditional prohibition… ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member States and their subjects"). 
10 Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 25. 
11 Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 12. 
12 Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 21 The words “individuals concerned” in the 
English version is ‘particuliers intéressés’ in French and ‘interessierten Einzelnen’ in German. 
13 Judgment of 5 February 1963, van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 13. 
14 Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56. Ms. Defrenne claimed rights under Article 119 
EEC to challenge terms of her contract with the airline SABENA obliging her to retire at the age of 40 whilst her male 
colleagues were allowed to work until the age of 55 allowing them to reach higher levels of salaries and retirement pensions. 
15 Now Article 157 TFEU, which requires Member States to eliminate discrimination between men and women in professional 
settings. 
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of non-discrimination of pay at work, conferred an individual right to the plaintiff in the contrac-
tual relation between herself and her employer.16 Defrenne II also shows that the origin of “indi-
vidual rights which the courts must protect” may be temporary and/or contextual:17 the Court 
finds that although the former Article 119 EEC may require certain specific legislative and non-
legislative measures for implementation,18 the provision is sufficiently clear and precise to iden-
tify prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender - at least in some circumstances. The court 
thus held that “any individual who has an interest in the performance of the duties thus laid 
down” i.e. anyone who is subject to such identifiable discrimination on the basis of gender, has 
an enforceable individual right under EU law.19  
IV The development of the concept of individual rights in state liability cases 
The approach developed inter alia in Algera, Van Gend en Loos and Defrenne II is the starting point 
for identifying individual rights in primary and secondary law.20 In addition, the CJEU has devel-
oped state liability of Member States of the EU for violation of EU law along the concept of 
individual rights laid down in Algera, Van Gend en Loos and Defrenne II. Liability, in view of the 
Court is “the necessary corollary of the direct effect of the Community provision whose breach 
caused the damage sustained.”21 Where provisions of a directive, for example, are “sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional for an individual to rely on them as against a Member State 
before a national court”, their violation may give rise to liability.22 
                                                 
16 In that respect, the approach was similar to a the development of rights arising from obligations in religious law maintain 
commandments of the nature of ‘though shalt not’…. See for a discussion Benjamin Porat, ‘Rights-Based Law v Duty-
Based Law: Old Dilemma, New Perspective’, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 16-
04 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696463> accessed 12 January 2016. 
17 Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para. 19 see also paras 20-24. See agreeing, C. 
Hilson and T. Downes, ‘Making sense of rights: Community rights in E.C. law’ [1999] European Law Review 121, p. 138 
quoting P. Eleftheriadis, ‘The Direct Effect of Community Law: Conceptual Issues’ (1996) 16 Yearbook of European Law 
205, p. 211 (direct effect cannot be the attribute of rules themselves: legal effects depend on the application of those rules 
in concrete cases). 
18 Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para. 19. 
19 See Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para. 31 which reads in the French version 
of the judgment “tout particulier intéressé à l'observation des obligations ainsi définies’’ and in the German version “allen 
an der Einhaltung der so umschriebenen Pflichten interessierten Privatpersonen Rechte verliehen sein können.” 
20 Rights in regulations: Judgment of 14 December 1971, Politi v. Ministero delle finanze, C-43/71, EU:C:1971:122, paras 9-11; 
rights in decisions: Judgment of 6 October 1970, Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, 9/70, EU:C:1970:78, para 9; Judgment of 10 
November 1992, Hansa Fleisch v. Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, C-156/91, EU:C:1992:423, paras 12-13; Judgment of 
12 December 1990, Kaefer and Procacci v French State, C-100/89, EU:C:1990:456, para 24; Judgment of 28 September 1999, 
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft Chemnitz v Commission, T-254/97, EU:T:1999:178, para 29 and case law cited. Rights in directives: 
Judgment of 4 December 1974, Van Duyn v. Home Office, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133, paras 11 to 14; Judgment of 12 May 
1987, Traen, Joined Cases C-372/85 to C-374/85, EU:C:1987:222, paras 25-26; Judgment of 20 September 1988, Beentjes, 
C-31/87, EU:C:1988:422, paras 43-44; Judgment of 23 February 1994, Comitato di coordinamento per la difesa della Cava v 
Regione Lombardia, C-236/92, EU:C:1994:60, paras 8-9. A. Dashwood, ‘The Principle of Direct Effect in European Com-
munity Law’ (1982) 16 Journal of Common Market Studies 229. 
21 Judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame, Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79 para 20-22. 
22 Judgment of 18 January 2001, Stockholm Lindöpark, C-150/99, EU:C:2001:34, para 33. 
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The way that the CJEU has formulated the conditions for state liability has raised some questions 
as to whether the existence of a clear and precise obligation can give rise to an individual right to 
compliance with that obligation, which in case of violation results in a right to damages. The 
reason for is that the condition for a breach of EU law to give rise to state liability under Brasserie 
du Pêcheur refers to whether a sufficiently serious infringement of a rule “intended to confer rights 
on individuals” caused the damage sustained.23  
It has been argued that this formulation contains additional criteria for liability. It would be, in 
this view, conceptually distinct from the notion of direct effect and of the simple link between 
obligations and rights formulated in Algera, Van Gend en Loos and Defrenne II.24 The reason is that 
the term “intended” is seen as an apparent departure from the more generally formulated re-
quirement that the rule should “entail” the grant of rights as required in Francovich. This evokes 
for many readers the concept of what in German and Austrian legal systems is referred to as a 
“Schutznorm”. Under the Schutznorm doctrine, liability requires that the legal act which was 
breached must have explicitly intended to confer an individual right on the damaged party. 
Should the Schutznorm approach be applicable to state liability cases, the violation of a clear and 
precise obligation would not in itself be sufficient. Instead, liability would exist only in cases in 
which the violated provision could be proven to have been intended to protect individuals indi-
vidually. However, when taking an overall view, it appears that the case law of the CJEU has 
generally applied a much broader notion of ‘intent’ than generally applied in the narrower Schutz-
norm-style sense.25  
For example, in Kampffmeyer, an early agriculture case, German authorities had withheld from the 
plaintiff Kampffmeyer an authorisation to import maize on the basis of a European Commission 
decision. The plaintiff asked for damages from the Commission for wrong interpretation and 
application of the relevant regulation. The Court found that even though the provisions at issue 
were “of a general nature,” this did not prevent “their including the interests of individual under-
taking such as the applicants.”26 The same broad understanding of ‘intent’ is to be found in the 
case law on state liability, for instance in Dillenkofer. The Court stressed that the absence of clear 
indication that the provision at issue should confer rights did not prevent it from doing so.27 
                                                 
23 Judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame, Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79, para 51 and Judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil 
v Commission, C-352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361. F. Mariatte and R. Munoz (D. Simon ed), Contentieux de l’Union européenne 
/ 2 - Carence. Responsabilité, Lamy (Paris 2011), p. 239. By contrast, Francovich required in different terms that the rule of 
law allegedly breached should ‘‘entail the grant of rights to individuals’’. Judgment of 19 November 1991, Francovich and 
Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428, para 40. 
24 A. Türk, Judicial review in EU law, Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham 2009), p. 258. 
25 Judgment of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the EEC, Joined cases C-5/66, C-13/66, C-16/66, C-
21/66, EU/C/1967:31. 
26 Judgment of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the EEC, Joined cases C-5/66, C-13/66, C-16/66, C-21/66, 
EU/C/1967:31, p.262; Mariatte and Munoz, ‘Contentieux de l’Union européenne / 2 - Carence. Responsabilité’, p. 240; 
K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis, K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford 2014), p. 516. 
27 Judgment of 8 October 1996, Dillenkofer and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188 to 
C-190/94, EU:C:1996:375 para 40-41. See also Judgment of 15 June 1999, Rechberger and Others, C-140/97, EU:C:1999:306 
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Instead, the Court analysed the wording, purpose and preamble of the directive and made clear 
that while the directive intended to ensure broadly defined objectives such as the freedom to 
provide services, this did not preclude its provisions from also protecting consumers.28  
Just when this issue seemed sufficiently settled, in Peter Paul of 2004 the CJEU applied a very 
restrictive ‘intentionalist’ approach to the conditions of state liability, for which the Court was 
abundantly criticised by some of the commentators.29 In Peter Paul a German court had referred 
a question regarding the liability of the German state for the violation of a number of supervisory 
obligations vis-à-vis credit institutions, which were conferred on the national authorities by sev-
eral EU directives. The CJEU held that “it does not necessarily follow” from the existence of 
Member State obligations vis-à-vis credit institutions that the directives “seek to confer rights on 
the depositors in the event that their deposits are unavailable as a result of defective supervision 
on the part of the competent national authorities.”30 Thereby, Peter Paul to a certain degree dis-
connects obligations from rights, when obligations in the directive are aimed at protecting the 
general public.31 
But the 2009 case of Danske Slagterier overturns the stricter interpretation of Peter Paul. In Danske 
Slagterier the German Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof) sought clarification from the 
CJEU as to whether producers and marketers of pork could seek damages for violation of a 
directive describing in detail the obligations of national veterinary inspection authorities but 
which makes no explicit mention of individual rights. In Danske Slagterier the CJEU explicitly 
rejected the AG’s arguments in favour of an ‘intentionalist’ approach based inter alia on an appli-
cation of the German Schutznorm approach to identifying individual rights32 and the earlier case 
Peter Paul.33 The CJEU found that since the directive prohibits the Member States from prevent-
                                                 
para 33, paras 60-61. A contrario, see Judgment of 17 October 1996, Denkavit Internationaal and Others v Bundesamt für Finanzen, 
C-283/94, EU:C:1996:387, paras 50-53 where the Court held that no sufficiently clear obligation could be identified and 
that there was therefore no need for further assessment of liability. Liability cases concerning rules which have direct effect 
also highlight that there is no need to search for an intention to grant a right where the norm invoked imposes a clear, 
precise and unconditional obligation: Judgment of 2 April 1998, Norbrook Laboratories v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, C-127/95, EU:C:1998:151, para 108; Judgment in The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley 
Lomas (Ireland), C-5/94, EU:C:1996:205, para 27; Judgment of 18 January 2001, Stockholm Lindöpark, C-150/99, 
EU:C:2001:34, para 29, paras 39-40. 
28 Judgment of 8 October 1996, Dillenkofer and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188 to 
C-190/94, EU:C:1996:375 para 39. 
29 See e.g. M. Tison, 'Do Not Attack the Watchdog! Banking Supervisors Liability after Peter Paul' (2005) 42 Common Mar-
ket Law Review 639. See also: N. Reich, 'Horizontal Liability in EC Law: Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation 
in Case of Breaches of EC Rights' (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 705, p. 718; S. Prechal, 'Protection of Rights: 
How Far?' in S. Prechal and B. Van Roermund (eds), The Coherence of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 166; A. 
Biondi and M. Farley, The Right to Damages in European Law, Kluwer Law International (2009), p. 36. 
30 Judgment of 12 October 2004, Paul and Others, C-222/02, EU:C:2004:606, para 40. 
31 Judgment of 12 October 2004, Paul and Others, C-222/02, EU:C:2004:606. 
32 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Danske Slagterier, C-445/06, EU:C:2008:464. 
33 Judgment of 24 March 2009, Danske Slagterier, C-445/06, ECLI:EU:C:2009:178, para 24 and Opinion of AG Trstenjak in 
Danske Slagterier, C-445/06, EU:C:2008:464. See also D. Simon and A. Rigaux, ‘La responsabilité des Etats membres en 
cas de violation du droit communautaire revisitée, ou comment le problème technique de l'odeur sexuelle des porcs non 
castrés conduit à trancher des questions fondamentales’ (2009) 19 Europe. 
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ing importation of meat, which had been properly inspected in the country of origin. This, ac-
cording to the CJEU “gives individuals the right to market in another Member State fresh meat 
that complies with the Community requirements” 34 and any violation of this right may give rise 
to liability of the State.35  
In 2015 the General Court (GC) confirmed in Staelen v Ombudsman the well-established CJEU 
case law by accepting that the requirement of a “rule of law intended to confer rights” is satisfied 
by a variety of rules, including those that essentially protect the general interest but that are also 
“of a protective nature” towards individuals. According to the GC, the principles of diligence, 
the right to good administration and the rules governing inquiries conducted by the Ombudsman 
fall into this category.36 On appeal the Court of Justice did not explicitly address this issue but its 
asking the question whether there was ‘a sufficiently serious breach of the Ombudsman’s duty to act dili-
gently’ may be read as an implicit acknowledgement that this duty constitutes a ‘rule intended to 
confer rights’.37 
V Result: The ‘subjectivation’ of obligations under EU law 
The approach developed by the CJEU discussed so far in this article defines individual rights in 
EU law as arising from clear, precise and unconditional obligations, which individuals are inter-
ested in seeing fulfilled. Obligations, according to the Court, can be formulated in positive law – 
Treaties, legislation and other acts. But, as Algera testifies, and the early case law of the CJEU on 
fundamental rights since Stauder 38 confirms, obligations can also arise from unwritten general 
principles of law.  
The reason for the Court’s approach is twofold: Van Gend en Loos had already pointed to an 
important factor in EU law, which is that individuals, when enforcing their rights, do not only 
act in their individual interest but also, by what has become known as functional ‘subjectivation’, 
contribute to enforcing obligations established in the general good.39 As the clear, precise and 
unconditional obligation of an EU institution, a Member State or an individual under EU law 
may amount to a right for the concerned individual, the latter in turn has an incentive to make 
sure that the obligation is respected. Individuals, by detecting and tackling violations of Union 
                                                 
34 Judgment of 24 March 2009, Danske Slagterier, C-445/06, ECLI:EU:C:2009:178, para 24. 
35 Judgment of 24 March 2009, Danske Slagterier, C-445/06, ECLI:EU:C:2009:178, para 24. 
36 Judgment of 29 April 2015 in Staelen v Ombudsman, T-217/11, EU:T:2015:238, para 73 and the case law cited and para 88.  
37 Judgment of 4 April 2017, European Ombudsman v Staelen, C-337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, para. 41. 
38 Judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder, C-26/69, EU:C:1969:57, and subsequent case law, e.g. Judgment of 14 May 
1974, Nold v Commission, 4/73, EU:C:1974:51, and Judgment of 13 December 1979, Hauer, C-44/79, EU:C:1979:290. 
39 M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court, Hart (Oxford 1998), p. 9; M. Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community 
Law: a Comparative View’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 319, 327; J. Masing, Die Mobilisierung des Bürgers für die 
Durchsetzung des Rechts: europäische Impulse für eine Revision der Lehre vom subjektiv-öffentlichen Recht, Duncker & Humblot 
(1997), p. 22 – writing prior to becoming judge at the German Constitutional Court, he uses the term ‘Versubjektivierung'. 
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law and subsequently their individual rights, contribute to realizing the objectives of the Union.40 
In order to achieve this, the Court is not concerned with establishing whether the obligation 
which gives rise to the right had intended to grant rights to individuals, similar to the interpreta-
tion of the concept of a ‘subjective right’ under the doctrine of the ‘Schutznorm’ as applied in 
several Member States including Germany and Austria. Instead the question is only put as to 
whether an individual is, as Van Gend en Loos states, “concerned”, in French “intéressés” and in 
German “interessiert” in the compliance with the obligation. The notion of interest or concern 
in a measure or its outcome includes not only legally pre-defined interest but also economic and 
other interests. 
Irrespective of possible legislative intent identifiable or not in a purposive analysis of the provi-
sion, the approach is marked by an analysis of the concrete circumstances assessed through test-
ing whether a norm defining an obligation is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to grant 
a party concerned by the obligation a right to enforce it. An action based on rights has effects 
beyond the individual sphere, since individuals, by claiming rights, contribute to realizing the 
objectives of the Union in a way a centralised enforcement of EU law through the Commission 
as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ could and would not be able to do.41 
Algera and Van Gend en Loos also led the way to understanding that Union law, which did not 
initially identify individual rights neither in the Treaty law nor in a Charter of fundamental rights, 
did not mean that the subjects of EU law were only the Member States. Obviously, this public 
international law-based understanding was explicitly rejected by the early case law of the CJEU 
in favour of a concept of ‘constitutionalisation’ of EU law by which enforceable individual rights 
were regarded to be part of the legal fabric of EU law. In view of protecting such rights, the 
‘subjectivation’42 of Union law as a whole from the perspective of enforcement of compliance 
with EU generated and generates, from the point of view of effective enforcement of EU law, a 
virtuous circle.43  
                                                 
40 B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in: G. De Burca and P. Craig (eds), The Evolution 
of EU Law, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press (Oxford 2011), pp. 323-362; C. Callies, ‘Kohärenz und Konvergenz beim 
europäischen Individualrechtsschutz - Der Zugang zum Gericht im Lichte des Grundrechts auf effektiven Rechtsschutz’ 
(2002) 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3577, p. 3579. 
41 Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: a Comparative View’, p. 327; see also Callies, ‘Kohärenz und 
Konvergenz beim europäischen Individualrechtsschutz - Der Zugang zum Gericht im Lichte des Grundrechts auf 
effektiven Rechtsschutz’, p. 3579; L. Azoulai, ‘L’autonomie de l’individu européen et la question du statut’ EUI 
Department of Law Research paper 4; R. Lecourt, L’Europe des juges, Bruylant (Brussels 1976), p. 260.  
42 Poiares Maduro, We the Court, p. 9. 
43 De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’; see also F. Mayer, ‘Van Gend en Loos: the Foundation 
of a Community of Law’, in: M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: the Classics of EU Law 
Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart (2010), 16-25, at 24. Grzesczick further argues that the development 
of subjective rights in EU law had shown how the individual can become a motor for the implementation of objective law 
and therefore contribute to the protection of the interests of the Union: B. Grzeszick, ‘Das Grundrecht auf eine gute 
Verwaltung - Strukturen und Perspektiven des Charta-Grundrechts auf eine gute Verwaltung’ (2006) Europarecht 161, p. 
179.  
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The advantage of this approach is that it results in empowerment of each individual person, 
combining a public objective, as expressed in the obligation under EU law, and a private inter-
est.44 It allows a legal system to disregard the Schutznorm-doctrine’s implicit distinction between, 
on one hand, a public interest, which is only for public entities to pursue, and, on the other hand, 
a genuine private interest which is recognised as such by the law and can result in individual 
rights. Instead, the CJEU’s approach is to accept the role of individuals in a pluralistic society to 
enforce individual rights and corresponding obligations also in the interest of the public. This 
approach is both a historically grown essential characteristic of EU law and a guarantee for its 
effective enforcement.45 
VI The dirty secret when it comes to enforcement of EU law before the CJEU as op-
posed to before national courts  
The familiar pattern of combining obligations with individual interests to identify rights does not 
always apply smoothly. Some elements of both procedural and substantive EU law challenge the 
application of the classic model. In terms of procedural law, the restrictive conditions for indi-
viduals lodging an action for annulment make access to court infamously difficult, especially by 
comparison with the broad access to court that the Court requires from Member States in order 
to protect individual rights under EU law.46 The reliance on a restrictive conception of interest 
as a filter additionally creates a bias by limiting the possibility of identifying rights being claimed 
before the EU courts, as opposed to before national courts where comparable filters are not 
acceptable under EU law, thus allowing rights to be identified by reference to broadly conceived 
individual interests.  
Concerning substantive law, at least two areas depart from the familiar pattern. In State aid, the 
very limited direct effect of Treaty provisions means that problems are not phrased in terms of 
rights. Individual interests do not matter much in a relationship that is predominantly one be-
tween the Commission and the Member States,47 and in which individuals are prevented from 
playing the role of ‘vigilante’ that Van Gend en Loos granted them. Another area where this role is 
                                                 
44 Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy’ p. 96; quoting 
T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford 2010), pp. 209-258. 
45  Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: a Comparative View’, p. 327; Callies, ‘Kohärenz und 
Konvergenz beim europäischen Individualrechtsschutz - Der Zugang zum Gericht im Lichte des Grundrechts auf 
effektiven Rechtsschutz’, p. 3579; L. Azoulai, ‘L'autonomie de l'individu européen et la question du statut’, p. 4; Lecourt, 
L'Europe des juges, p. 260; Masing, Die Mobilisierung des Bürgers für die Durchsetzung des Rechts: europäische Impulse für eine Revision 
der Lehre vom subjektiv-öffentlichen Recht, p. 44; A. Voßkuhle and A.-B. Kaiser, ‘Grundwissen – Öffentliches Recht: Das 
subjektiv-öffentliche Recht’ (2009) Juristische Schulung 16, p. 18; D. Curtin, ‘Directives: the Effectiveness of Judicial 
Protection of Individual Rights’ (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 709. 
46 See e.g. A. Arnull, ‘The action for annulment: A case of double standards?’ in D. O'Keefe D and A. Bavasso (eds), Judicial 
Review in European Union Law (Kluwer Law International 2000). 
47 In Costa v E.N.E.L. the Court held, concerning Article 93 EEC (laying down the framework for State aid control): ‘By so 
expressly undertaking to inform the Commission ‘in sufficient time' of any plans for aid, and by accepting the procedures laid down in Article 
93, the States have entered into an obligation with the Community, which binds them as States but creates no individual rights except in the 
case of the final provision of Article 93(3))’. Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66, p. 596. 
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limited is access to documents of the EU institutions. Regulation 1049/2001 posits that anyone 
has an interest in having access to documents. This backfires in a peculiar way: the ‘right’ is 
subjected to so many conditions that it corresponds to an enforceable obligation only residually. 
In addition, individual interest, which classically would function as a powerful trigger, is taken 
out of the equation and the balancing exercise is between a relatively abstract public interest and 
the precisely defined private interests against disclosure.48 These ‘anomalies’ putting under strain 
the basic concept of a right might be revealing the limits of the rationale behind this concept; the 
interests of individuals are not always presumed to converge with effectiveness of EU law and 
more generally the interests of the EU. This would in turn need to be acknowledged and clarified. 
B Did the Charter of Fundamental Rights render obligations irrelevant? 
The very existence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) has led to some 
important challenges to this method of developing individual rights under EU law. The CFR 
introduced into EU law a positive law list of individual rights, as opposed to the often obligation-
based language used in other Treaty provisions thus far used to identify rights. If rights are for-
mulated in a different document than the obligations the link between rights and obligations 
become less obvious. Consequently, several questions arise as to the future of deriving individual 
rights from clearly and precisely formulated obligations when their enforcement is in the interest 
of an individual. 
One such question relates to the methodology of the Charter as source of rights and its relation 
to rights arising from obligations under the Treaty (1). Another question is linked to the issue 
whether the introduction of the distinction between rights and principles in Articles 51(1), and 
52(2) and (5) CFR has caused the link between rights and obligations under EU law to rupture 
(2).  
I A change in sources of rights?  
Two arguments would appear to be speaking against a systematic switch to an all positive-law 
based approach. One is the declaration in paragraph five of the Charter’s Preamble explaining 
that the CFR merely “reaffirms” pre-existing rights. The source of the rights is thereby not 
touched by the fact that the rights are reaffirmed from their original sources as rights derived 
from obligations formulated in the Treaties in legislation or as rights recognised by General Prin-
ciples of EU law. Further, the explanations of the Charter “set out the sources” for each of the 
rights listed in the Charter. These explanations include the origins of the case law based on the 
rights-obligations link. Since CFR rights “shall be interpreted” “with due regard to these expla-
nations”,49 one might argue that nothing substantial should change as to the origin of rights. 
                                                 
48 E.g. Judgment of 1 February 2007, Sison v Council, C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75, para 46. 
49 See Art. 6(1)third subpara TEU, paragraph five of the Preamble of the CFR, Article 52(7) CFR. 
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Another argument arises from the fact that Article 6 TEU lists two parallel sources of fundamen-
tal rights of the Union: Next to the CFR referred to in Article 6(1) TEU, Article 6(3) TEU also 
recognises fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. Although some voices in legal 
writing had initially argued in favour of relegating the general principles of law to a secondary 
position for gap filling purposes only, and thereby advocating a ‘hierarchic’ understanding of the 
relation between sources of fundamental rights in the Union,50 the CJEU never followed this 
suggestion in its case law. In our view, the CJEU did so correctly since the Charter was never 
intended to mark an entirely new start in the application of fundamental rights in the Union.51 
Instead, it was designed to be a document which makes transparent the acquis, developed over 
decades of case law, “by making those rights more visible in a Charter”,52 but maintaining the 
flexibility necessary for future developments. General principles of EU law therefore continue to 
be a parallel source of fundamental rights in the Union next to the Charter under Article 6(3) 
TEU.53 Additionally, individual rights are not always ‘fundamental’, constitutional rights but can 
arise from multiple legal documents, including fundamental freedoms defined in the TFEU, and 
legislative and non-legislative acts of the institutions. The inclusion of the Charter as binding legal 
document did not intend to overthrow the legal system of the Union by excluding that effective 
enforcement of obligations formulated in EU law by individuals, a staple of EU law since Algera, 
Van Gen den Loos and Defrenne II.  
The idea of a continuation of the existing approach also arises from Article 52(2) CFR according 
to which any right under the Charter must be interpreted and “exercised under the conditions 
and within the limits” defined by relevant Treaty provisions which make provision for it. This 
provides for a continuous link between the formulation of rights in the Charter and obligations 
under the Treaty provisions.54 Procedural rights positively formulated in the Charter serve as 
                                                 
50 V. Skouris, Working Group II ‘Intégration de la Charte/adhésion à la CEDH’ (2002), http://european-conven-
tion.eu.int/docs/wd2/3063.pfd (last access on 31 March 2012): ‘Mon sentiment est, que, à partir du moment où la 
CE/l’UE se dotera d’un catalogue contraignant de droits fondamentaux, il ne faudra plus recourir aux principes géné-
raux du droit (et, par conséquent, aux traditions constitutionnelles communes et à la CEDH) en tant que source parallèle 
ou, pour ainsi dire, "concurrente et équivalente" en matière de droits fondamentaux, mais seulement en tant que source 
subsidiaire et complémentaire. Ainsi la Cour devrait recourir aux principes généraux du droit uniquement pour combler les 
éventuelles lacunes du texte de la Charte […]’ ; S. Prechal, ‘Competence creep and general principles of law’, 3 Review of 
European Administrative Law (2010), 5-22, at p. 21. For a more recent contribution, see S. Prechal, S. de Vries and H. van 
Eijken, ‘The principle of attributed powers and the ‘scope of EU law’, in L. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds), 
The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union Kluwer (The Hague, 2011), 213-247; C. Calliess, Die neue Europäische 
Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen, 2010), p. 322. 
51 This is occasionally claimed in the doctrinal discussion, see e.g. C. L. Thomas, ‘Zum Verhältnis zwischen 
Grundrechtecharta und allgemeinen Grundsätzen’ 2011 Europarecht, 715-735 at p. 733. 
52 Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
53 H.C.H. Hofmann and B. Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter's Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General 
Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ 9 European Constitutional Law Review 73. 
54 See for an example, the link between Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47(1) CFR. Other examples include, as acknowledged 
in the Explanations: the right to the protection of personal data, enshrined at Article 8 of the Charter but based on Article 
286 TEC, now replaced by Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU; the right to non-discrimination (Article 21 CFR and 
Articles 18 and 19 TFEU); the right to environmental protection (Article 37 CFR, Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 11 and 
191 TFEU); the right to vote and stand as a candidate at European and municipal elections (Articles 39 and 40 CFR and 
Article 20(2) TFEU); the right to good administration (Article 41 CFR and Articles 20, 25, 296 and 340 TFEU), etc. 
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good examples for this approach. Most of the rights listed under the Right to Good Administra-
tion (article 41 CFR) are obligations already existing in the Treaty such as relating to fairness, 
compliance with the rule of law and its sub-principles, obligation to grant access to documents, 
to reason an act and to make good damages. Others were accepted in the case law of the CJEU 
as general principles of law.55 Equally, Article 47 CFR establishing the right to an effective judicial 
remedy to protect rights arising under EU law, has an equivalent in Article 19(1) TEU under 
which Member States “shall provide the remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection 
in the fields covered by Union law.” This right has been protected as a general principle of EU 
law since Johnston and Heylens.56 It was subsequently reaffirmed in Article 47 CFR as the right to 
an ‘effective remedy before a tribunal’ which is also a specification of the general obligation under 
the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) obliging Member States to “take any 
appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising” from 
EU law. The CJEU has repeatedly held that the principle of sincere cooperation includes the 
obligation of judicial enforcement of EU law before national Courts.57 The obligations of the 
Member States under Articles 4(3) and 19 TEU are thus mirrored by the individual right to an 
                                                 
Barents uses the French term ‘dédoublement': R. Barents, ‘Een grondwet voor Europa (VI): de grondrechten’ (2005) 
Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht 39, p. 42.  
55 H.C.H. Hofmann and B. Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter's Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General 
Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’. The General Court, relying on Article 52(2) CFR, has 
pointed out the link between the right to a reasoned decision as set out in Article 41(2)(c) CFR and the obligation to give 
reasons laid down at Article 296 TFEU: Judgment of 3 December 2015, Cuallado Martorell v Commission, T-506/12 P, 
EU:T:2015:931, para 36. The CJEU also seemed to equate Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 CFR in Pesce: Judgment of 9 
June 2016, Pesce and Others, Joined Cases C-78/16 and C-79/16, EU:C:2016:428, para 94. 
56 The Court of Justice has repeatedly found this right to be a fundamental right of individuals resulting from the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States and recognised Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. The fundamental rights 
arising from this are thus also protected as General Principles of EU law under Article 6(3) TEU. See e.g.: Judgment of 
15 May 1986, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, C-222/84, EU:C:1986:206, paras 18 and 19; Judg-
ment of 15 October 1987, Unectef v Heylens, C-222/86, EU:C:1987:442, para 14; Judgment of 27 November 2001, Com-
mission v Austria, C-424/99, EU:C:2001:642, para 45; Judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, C-50/00 P, 
EU:C:2002:462, para 39; Judgment of 19 June 2003, Eribrand, C-467/01, EU:C:2003:364, para 61; Judgment of 13 
March 2007, Unibet, C-432/05, EU:C:2007:163, para 37; Judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, para 335; Judgment 
of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling, C-12/08, EU:C:2009:466, para 47; Judgment of 18 March 2010, Alassini and Others, 
Joined cases C-317 to C-320/08, EU:C:2010:146, para 61. 
57 See to the relation between the principle of sincere cooperation and the right to an effective judicial remedy e.g.: Judg-
ment of 16 December 1976, Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, C-33/76, EU:C:1976:188, para 5; Judgment of 
16 December 1976, Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-45/76, EU:C:1976:191, para 12; Judgment of 9 March 
1978, Simmenthal, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paras 21 and 22; Judgment of 19 June 1990, The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame, C-213/89, EU:C:1990:257, para 19; Judgment of 14 December 1995, Peterbroeck, Van Camp-
enhout & Cie v Belgian State, C-312/93, EU:C:1995:437, para 12; Judgment of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C-432/05, 
EU:C:2007:163, para 38: ‘Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], it is for 
the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law’. The Court regularly 
recites the formulation according to which ‘it is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the 
matter it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction 
and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from 
Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic ac-
tions (the principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness).’ See: Judgment of 4 December 2003, Evans, C-63/01, 
EU:C:2003:650, para 45 with reference also to Judgment of 21 January 1999, Upjohn, C-120/97, EU:C:1999:14, para 32. 
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effective judicial review, recognised also by Article 47 CFR.58 Likewise in Delvigne, concerning the 
right to vote in the elections for the European Parliament, the Court acknowledged the corre-
spondence between rights formulated in Articles 39(1) and 39(2) CFR and obligations laid down 
in Articles 20(2)(b) TFEU and 14(3) TEU. The existing case law on the rights arising from obli-
gations established by Treaty provisions was in each case used order to interpret the equivalent 
provisions formulating specific individual rights in the Charter.59 
II The distinction between rights and principles in Articles 51 and 52 CFR 
An altogether different question is whether the rights-principles distinction contained in Article 
51(1) as well as in Article 52(1) and (5) CFR requires a re-definition of the nature and origin of a 
‘right’ under EU law. The distinction drawn in Article 52(5) CFR runs counter to the established 
notion of a principle in EU law as expressed for example in Defrenne II where some Member 
States had argued that non-discrimination as an expression of the social intentions of the Treaty 
was merely the expression of a ‘principle’ and could as such not have direct effect.60 In essence 
the argument was that the principle did not contain an obligation sufficiently clear and precise to 
confer a right on Ms Defrenne. The Court had rejected that argument stating that a Treaty pro-
vision labelled as a principle indicates that it “is specifically used in order to indicate the funda-
mental nature” of certain provisions, which actually supports the idea of deriving rights instead 
of denying them.61  
Article 52(5) CFR seems to come back to the notion that there are rights, which are sufficiently 
clear and precise to be applied directly in favour of an individual as individual rights and there 
are principles, which require further development in legislative acts in order to grant individual 
rights. However, the introduction into the Charter of the distinction between rights and princi-
ples had also been understood in a more far reaching sense, in that an individual right under the 
Charter existed only where the (constitutional) legislator had ‘intention’ of conferring such right 
to an individual. Where no clear intention of conferring a specific individual right would be de-
tectable, so the argument forwarded by several AGs in cases before the CJEU and some voices 
in the literature went, the Charter provision would need to be categorized as a ‘principle’ in the 
                                                 
58 See for example with many further references C-93/12 Agrokonsulting of 27 June 2013, paras. 34-61. An example of a sub-
stantive right for which the Court follows the same logic of relating rights to obligations is the free movement of persons, 
protected as right arising from Article 45 TFEU, setting out obligations, as well as from Article 15(2) CFR, formulated as 
individual right. Judgment of 4 July 2013, Gardella, C-233/12, EU:C:2013:449, para 39; Judgment of 7 April 2016, ONEm 
and M, C-284/15, para 33. 
59 Judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:648, para 41. 
60 Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para. 7. 
61 Judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. SABENA, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para. 28. This has also been emphasized by S. 
Prechal, ‘Rights v principles, or how to remove fundamental rights from the jurisdiction of the courts’ in: J. De Zwaan, 
J.H. Hans and F.A. Nelissen (eds), The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration - Liber Amicorum Alfred E Kellermann, 
T.M.C. Asser Press (The Hague 2004) 177-185 and S. Prechal, ‘EU Gender Equality Law: a source of inspiration for other 
EU legal fields?’ [2008] European Gender Equality Law Review 10. 
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sense of Article 52(5) of the Charter.62 Such concept of searching for the legislative intention as 
basis for recognising a right is strongly evocative of the doctrine of subjective public rights (sub-
jective öffentliche Rechte) based on the doctrine of the Schutznorm advocated prominently, but 
not exclusively, in German-speaking legal systems.63 
The problem with this approach looking for legislative intention is not only that the Charter’s 
explanations are famously tight-lipped on classifying rights and principles. Only a few Charter 
Articles are marked as containing principles,64 some others are identified to contain both rights 
and principles.65 Also, intention is difficult to discern abstractly in Charter provisions alone. 
Charta provisions, under Article 52(4) CFR, “shall be interpreted in harmony with” General Prin-
ciples of EU law. And as Article 6(3) TEU makes clear, fundamental rights are also protected as 
General Principles of EU law. But since General Principles of EU law also, under Article 6(3) 
TEU, arise from the ECHR, Article 52(3) CFR requesting interpretation of the Charter as far as 
possible in line with the ECtHR case law would become relevant for the search of intention.  
Additionally, many rights arising from obligations are not only Treaty-based but are also formu-
lated in legislative acts:66 whose intention counts in this case? For example in Association de Médi-
ation Sociale (AMS), the referring court sought clarification as to whether Article 27 CFR on 
‘Workers' right to information and consultation’ as implemented by EU Directive 2002/14 re-
quiring that all categories of workers of an undertaking be taken into account for calculation of 
the number of employees, could have horizontal direct effect in the employee-employer relation. 
Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalón’s Opinion in AMS suggested a somewhat rigid distinction 
between rights and principles in that provisions which can be identified as rights would apply to 
individual situations, while principles would only define general matters and outcomes for guid-
ing the action of public authorities.67 According to AG Cruz Villalón, Charter ‘principles’ are 
thus obligations which bind the Member States and/or the EU Institutions, and their very nature 
excludes that rights could be derived from them.68 ‘‘The obligation in a Charter principle is ad-
dressed not only to the executive, but also to the legislature. Therefore, where the article refers 
to ‘implementation’ it is referring primarily to a specifically legislative implementation.”69 The AG’s 
position is problematic in that it would not only prevent applicants from challenging measures 
                                                 
62 See Krommendijk's review of the literature: J. Krommendijk, ‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role 
of the EU Charter's Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 321, 
p.22 citing in particular: ‘The Charter of Rights-A Brake Not an Accelerator’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Review 473, 
p. 476. 
63 See e.g. the description in: J. Masing, Die Mobilisierung des Bürgers für die Durchsetzung des Rechts: europäische Impulse für eine Revision 
der Lehre vom subjektiv-öffentlichen Recht, Duncker & Humblot (1997), p.14. 
64 Articles 25, 26 and 37 CFR. 
65 Articles 23, 33 and 34 CFR. 
66 e.g. Articles 5(3), 11(2), 23, 27, 31(1), 31(2), 32 and see P. Craig, ‘Rights, Legality, and Legitimacy’ in: P. Craig (ed), The Lisbon 
Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford University Press (Oxford 2010), p. 228. 
67 S. Robin-Olivier, The evolution of direct effect in the EU: Stocktaking, problems, projections (2014) 12 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 165, 169. 
68 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Association de médiation sociale (AMS), C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, para 62. 
69 Articles 25, 26 and 37 CFR. 
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which clearly violate Charter ‘principles’, as long as they do not give expression to them,70 it 
would also violate Article 277 TFEU by restricting recourse to the plea of illegality.  
The Court, in our view correctly, decided not to follow the suggestion of the AG in AMS, 71and 
ignored AG Cruz Villalón’s overly complex system for abstractly distinguishing Charter rights 
and principles.72 In fact, in AMS the Court does not refer to the rights/principles distinction in 
its reasoning and its solution is perfectly compatible with the Van Gend en Loos approach: Because 
of its wording, Article 27 CFR needs to be given more specific expression in order to be fully 
effective.73 Importantly, the circumstances of a case may lead to Article 27 CFR also directly 
conferring a right, even though, generally, the principle might not contain obligations sufficiently 
clear and precise to transform into a right.74 
Some recent cases confirm this impression. In PAN Europe,75 the General Court found that the 
obligation to “integrate into the policies of the Union” a “high level of environmental protection” 
“in accordance with the principle of sustainable development” under Article 37 CFR required 
further legislative specification in order to be directly applicable as an individual right. In Glatzl76 
the General Court found that Article 26 CFR, which states that the “Union recognises and re-
spects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure” certain 
benefits has been regarded as principle in that “must be given more specific expression in Euro-
pean Union or national law’’ since ‘‘that article cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective 
right which they may invoke as such.”77  
                                                 
70 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘L’article II-112’ in: L. Burgorgue-Larsen, A. Levade and F. Picod (eds), Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe : commentaire article par article, Tome 2, Partie II La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union, Bruylant (Brussels 
2005), p. 687; K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional 
Law Review 375, p. 400; K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, 
in: S. Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, Hart, (London 2014), p. 1577. 
71 Judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2. 
72 Yet, because the Court ended up stating that Article 27 of the Charter could not be invoked in the dispute, this ruling has 
sometimes been presented as one that categorized the latter provision as a ‘principle’. Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Schön-
berger, C-261/13 P, EU:C:2014:2107 para 57-58 and see also Judgment of 22 May 2014, Glatzel, C-356/12, EU:C:2014:350, 
para 78. 
73 Judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2, para 45. 
74 For this situation, not unlike the early sex discrimination case Defrenne II, see Judgment of 17 December 2015, Seigneur v 
ECB, F-95/14, EU:F:2015:155 and Judgment of 17 December 2015, Bowles v ECB, F-94/14, EU:F:2015:156, para 59. 
The CST also did not need to rely on the distinction between rights and principles in order to reach a solution in Heath, 
where it acknowledged that Article 28 enshrines the right to freedom of association, especially the right for workers to 
organise unions to defend their interests, but added that these rights do not translate into an obligation for EU institu-
tions to establish procedures for collective bargaining, nor into an obligation to grant any codecision power to trade un-
ions as regards the development of terms and conditions on employment (the GC then rejected the appeal without con-
sidering this issue). Judgment of 29 September 2011, Heath v ECB, F-121/10, ECLI:EU:F:2011:174 and Judgment of 18 
June 2013, Heath v ECB, T-645/11 P, ECLI:EU:T:2013:326. 
75 Judgment of 28 September 2016, PAN Europe and Others v Commission, T-600/15, EU:T:2016:601, paras 46-48. 
76 Judgment of 22 May 2014, Glatzel, C-356/12, EU:C:2014:350. 
77 Judgment of 22 May 2014, Glatzel, C-356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paras 77-78. 
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Equally the Court of Justice in Delvigne78 applied this approach of linking rights and principles to 
the principle of democratic participation and specific rights deducted therefrom (Article 39 CFR). 
The same applies to the right of petition. Although AG Jääskinen in Schönberger built his Opinion 
on a strict distinction between objective requirements and subjective rights, the CJEU in Schön-
berger looked at the substance of the obligation reflected in Article 20(2)(d) TFEU, Article 24, 
paragraph 2 TFEU, Article 227 TFEU and Article 44 CFR. It held that the individual had a 
corresponding right to have his petition examined.79 The same approach has been extended to 
European citizen initiatives (ECIs).80  
Given the risks inherent in a strict and intentionalist understanding of the rights/principles di-
chotomy, the more consistent and reliable alternative is to interpret this distinction as a restate-
ment of the Court's original methodology for identifying rights. Under this, any provision, even 
if phrased as an obligation, may give rise to rights in a given situation if it is sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional. This corresponds to Prechal's view that the rights/principles distinc-
tion “is nothing new” but should be applied on a case-by-case basis instead of through an a priori 
categorisation.81 Once the test has been performed in concreto, the rights/principles terminology 
could then come in to mark the justiciability gradation between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’. Support-
ive of this interpretation is that the introduction of the CFR intended no ‘freezing’ of the case 
law recognising only rights which were reaffirmed at the moment of the creation of the CFR82 
or even ‘deconstitutionalising’83 some pre-existing rights. This is finally well demonstrated by the 
parallel existence of Articles 6(1) and (3) TEU with rights arising from the Charter and rights 
arising from general principles of EU law on the same hierarchic level. 
Moreover, the formal and substantial proximity of Charter provisions with general principles of 
EU also provides arguments in favour of the potential direct effect of these provisions. Indeed, 
Charter provisions function a lot like general principles: the review of legality with Charter pro-
visions is triggered when the Court controls acts of secondary legislation which either implement 
                                                 
78 Judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:648. H. Van Eijken and J.W. Van Rossem, ‘Prisoner disen-
franchisement and the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament: Universal suffrage key to unlocking political 
citizenship?’ (2016) European Constitutional Law Review 114. 
79 Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Schönberger, C-261/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2107 (see especially paras 57-58 and 78-81) and 
Judgment of 9 December 2014 in Schönberger, C-261/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2423, paras 22-24. 
80 Judgment of 30 September 2015, Anagnostakis v Commission, T-450/12, EU:T:2015:739, para 26. See also Judgment of 19 
April 2016, Costantini and Others v Commission, T-44/14, EU:T:2016:223, para 73. Judgment of 3 February 2017, Minority 
SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Commission, T-646/13, EU:T:2017:59, para 17. For a detailed assessment 
of the mechanism of the ECI see A. Karatzia, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative and the EU institutional balance: On 
realism and the possibilities of affecting EU lawmaking’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review, Issue 1, pp. 177-208. 
81 Prechal, ‘Rights v principles, or how to remove fundamental rights from the jurisdiction of the courts’ 183. 
82 See L. Burgorgue-Larsen ‘Ombres et Lumières de la constitutionnalisation de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
européenne’, Cahiers de droit européen 681, p. 683: the Explanations have "la fâcheuse conséquence de congeler la jurisprudence en 
matière de protection des droits fondamentaux à l'échelle européenne". 
83 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 563, p. 576. 
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a Charter provision, refer to the Charter in a Preamble, or are reviewed against the Charter be-
cause the matter falls within the scope of EU law (Art. 51(1) CFR).84 After all, in abstracto, general 
principles often would not pass the direct effect test; yet, they clearly have been granted that 
effect in numerous concrete occasions when they did fulfil the requirements of precision, clarity 
and unconditionality. In such situations general principles entail rights which individuals may rely 
on.85 The same is true of several Charter provisions. The notion of ‘principles’ under Article 
52(5) CFR would come in to compensate for the lack of direct effect of a provision in a given 
situation.  
Such reasoning is also sound from a more theoretic point of view. An individual right in any 
given situation will first and foremost be reviewed in the context of that legislative act or its 
implementing measures. Only if doubts arise about the validity of the legislative act can the fun-
damental right be called upon to guide interpretation or establish a reason for annulment. Article 
277 TFEU is the embodiment of this concept, and is a standard feature in the case law of the 
CJEU for Charter rights (Art. 6(1) TEU) as well as for fundamental rights arising from General 
Principles of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU). 
C The relation between individual rights and remedies 
 Individual rights arising from EU law have to be “effectively protected in each case”,86 as a 
matter of effectiveness of EU law (Article 4(3) TEU) and according to the obligations under 
                                                 
84 D. Guðmundsdóttir, 'A Renewed Emphasis on the Charter's Distinction Between Rights and Principles: Is a Doctrine of 
Judicial Restraint More Appropriate?' (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 685, p. 706. 
85 Van Meerbeeck, ‘De la généralité in abstracto des principes généraux a ̀ leur effet direct in concreto’, 2016 1 Cahiers de droit 
européen (Les principes généraux du droit de l'Union européenne, Brussels, 10 September 2015) p. 65. Van Meerbeeck 
relies in particular on Opinion of AG Sharpston in Bartsch, C-427/06, EU:C:2008:297, para 79 ("It is trite Community law 
that general principles of law are capable of being invoked vertically against the State"); Opinion of AG Mazak in Palacios de la Villa, 
C-411/05, EU:C:2007:106, para 134; Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 116-136. 
Kucukdeveci and Dansk Industri are prominent examples of this effect of GPs in horizontal relations, and also highly 
problematic: the Danish court has also seen the parallel between how GPs work and how Charter provisions work and 
has rejected the possibility for both types of instruments to be sources of obligations and therefore of rights. see p. 47. 
86 Judgment of 9 July 1985, Bozzetti v Invernizzi, C-179/84, EU:C:1985:306, para 17; Judgment of 15 May 1986, Johnston v Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, C-222/84, EU:C:1986:206, para 18. Understood in that sense, Article 47 CFR 
requires a broad interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR. However, the right to an effective judicial remedy is also, next to its 
recognition under Article 47 CFR recognised as General Principle of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU), the application of which 
to Member States is limited by the case law and is not subject to Article 51 CFR. 
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Article 19(1) TEU.87 The effectiveness of this protection, however, may suffer when the ques-
tions of whether an individual right exists becomes confounded with the notion of whether a 
remedy exists.88  
For example in Olainfarm89 the CJEU had to decide whether a particular article of an EU directive 
on admission of medicines to the single market contained a ‘subjective’ individual right. The 
Latvian court asking for the interpretation of EU law linked the right to a judicial remedy to the 
existence of a subjective individual right90 - an approach typical of legal systems requiring a sub-
jective or individual right as a pre-condition for the admissibility of an action under the Schutznorm 
approach. Instead of looking at whether the directive intended to create a subjective right, the 
CJEU deducted from the the obligation imposed by the directive that it also “confers a concom-
itant right” on that individual to demand that his rights “are observed” and protected under 
Article 47 CFR.91  
The CJEU took the same approach in Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz.92 The local administrative 
court referred to the CJEU for interpretation of a directive on environmental impact assessments 
and the Habitats directive. The German legal provisions implementing the directives were inter-
preted by German case law as protecting only the general public and thus not granting individual 
rights, meaning that individuals—including environmental NGOs explicitly to be empowered 
under the directive—were de facto excluded from the possibility to ask for review of legality of 
a permit to construct a coal-fired power station. The CJEU held that the provisions of the di-
rective allowing standing in court for NGOs to defend the interests protected by the directives 
being “unconditional and sufficiently precise”,93 NGOs may therefore rely on these provisions 
                                                 
87 See to the relation between the principle of sincere cooperation and the right to an effective judicial remedy e.g.: Judgment 
of 16 December 1976, Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, para 5; Judgment of 16 De-
cember 1976, Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 45/76, EU:C:1976:191, para 12; Judgment of 9 March 1978, Sim-
menthal, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paras 21 and 22; Judgment of 19 June 1990, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame, C-213/89, EU:C:1990:257, para 19; Judgment of 14 December 1995, Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie v 
Belgian State, C-312/93, EU:C:1995:437, para 12; Judgment of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C-432/05, EU:C:2007:163, para 38: 
‘Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], it is for the Member States to 
ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law’. The Court regularly recites the formulation 
according to which ‘it is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the domestic 
legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed 
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, how-
ever, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) 
and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the 
principle of effectiveness).’ See: Judgment of 4 December 2003, Evans, C-63/01, EU:C:2003:650, para 45 with reference 
also to Judgment of 21 January 1999, Upjohn, C-120/97, EU:C:1999:14, para 32. 
88 Sometimes, detailed legislative and non-legislative acts outlining quite specifically not only substantive rights and obliga-
tions but also certain procedural aspects of protection might re-enforce this impression.  
89 Judgment of 23 October 2014, Olainfarm, C-104/13, EU:C:2014:2316. 
90 Judgment of 23 October 2014, Olainfarm, C-104/13, EU:C:2014:2316, para 22. 
91 Judgment of 23 October 2014, Olainfarm, C-104/13, EU:C:2014:2316, paras. 36-37. 
92 Judgment of 12 May 2011, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein Westfalen, C-115/09, 
EU:C:2011:289. 
93  Judgment of 12 May 2011, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein Westfalen, C-115/09, 
EU:C:2011:289 para 54. 
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“even where (…) the rules relied on protect only the interests of the general public and not the 
interests of the individuals.”94 The application of the German Schutznorm could not override the 
obligation to protect rights allocated under EU law.  
What these examples have in common is that they show that the uncertainty at the national level 
in some Member States on the relation between rights and remedies appears in some cases to be 
the consequence of an intentionalist approach to the identification of rights. To make sense of 
Court's reply in these cases, instead, it is important to see that the right to an effective remedy, 
exists where a right is identified under EU law. This right may be either explicitly phrased as 
individual right, or phrased as an obligation the enforcement of which is in the interest of the 
plaintiff because the plaintiff is concerned by the matter. The right of access to court in turn 
amounts to an obligation for Member States to provide that access, as the Court has made clear 
many times including in ClientEarth.95 The CJEU thereby confirms its earlier case law in cases 
such as CIA Security96 and Unilever97 in which it held that individuals that have a direct interest in 
the enforcement of an obligation imposed by a directive on a Member State could invoke this 
provision despite the directive creating “neither rights nor obligations for individuals”.98 
D Restating the question – identifying the sources of rights, their scope and 
their limitations 
This article is about identifying individual rights, not just ‘fundamental’ rights. The origins of EU 
law did not distinguish between various categories of rights. These categories came into play with 
the constitutionalisation of EU law during which not only administrative acts à la Algera needed 
to be addressed, but the questions to be dealt with in EU courts were often enough of constitu-
tional nature. They addressed, either, the relation between EU law and national (constitutional) 
law or they were relevant to asking which criteria were applicable for reviewing acts of legislative 
nature of the EU. 
Dissecting the approach to individual rights and the challenges the concept has undergone, es-
pecially with questions posed by the nature of the Charter rights, shows very familiar patterns. 
The identification of individual rights, when looked at through these conceptual differentiations 
has three steps which each contains elements of the overall concept. 
                                                 
94  Judgment of 12 May 2011 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein Westfalen, C-115/09, 
EU:C:2011:289 para 59. See also Judgment of 16 April 2015, Gruber, C-570/13, EU:C:2015:231, para 41, and Judgment of 
15 October 2015, Commission v Germany, C-137/14, EU:C:2015:683, para 90-94. 
95 Judgment of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C-404/13, EU:C:2014:2382. See also Judgment of 17 September 2014, Liivimaa 
Lihaveis, C-562/12, EU:C:2014:2229. 
96 Judgment of 30 April 1996, CIA Security International v Signalson and Securitel, C-194/94, EU:C:1996:172. 
97 Judgment of 26 September 2000, Unilever Italia, C- 443/98, EU:C:2000:496, Unilever Italia [2000] ECR I-7535. 
98 Judgment of 26 September 2000, Unilever Italia, C- 443/98, EU:C:2000:496, para 51. For further discussion see: Türk, Judi-
cial review in EU law, p. 259. 
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First, it is important to keep in mind, that the source of an individual right under EU law can be 
the positively formulated rights in the Charter as well as rights arising from obligations concern-
ing an individual or from general principles of EU law. The latter is especially important to recall, 
when it comes to discussions as to whether the CJEU could identify rights without acting ultra 
vires from general principles as it did in Dansk Industri which has given rise to one of the most 
pointed court disputes regarding the ultra vires nature of EU law to date.99  
Second, independently from whether the right arises from a norm identified as right or as an 
obligation, thinking in terms of obligations then helps identify the substance of the rule at issue, 
i.e. what behaviour (obligation to do, obligation not to do) or result is prescribed. Since any right 
has to be analysed as regards the scope of protection it affords to an individual, this is where the 
abstract rule may materialise into a right in a concrete case.  
The personal scope of protection, the question who is protected, is defined by the question of 
who is concerned, with other words who has an interest in the performance of the obligation. 
The interest does not need to have been predefined by the legislator: EU law identifies this issue 
not from the point of view of a possible legislative interest but from the point of view of the real-
life effect. This is the basis of the concept of ‘functional subjectivation’ making individuals in 
charge of enforcing law and is one of the important legacies of Van Gend en Loos visible and 
applied in EU law to this day. The personal scope of the correlative obligation thus mirrors the 
personal scope of the right, identifying who is obliged: it could be an institution or administration 
(in which case one might speak of ‘institutional’ scope) or a private individual. 
The material scope of an individual right then, not surprisingly, is influenced by whether its 
source allows for its clear, precise and unconditional identification. Defrenne II is the model ex-
ample showing that an obligation, being the source of the individual right, can in some contexts 
be regarded as sufficiently precise and unconditional for identifying an individual right therefrom 
but not in others. The specific situation of an individual might decide whether the individual is 
‘concerned’ and thus protected by the material scope of the right. This finding from Defrenne is 
also highly relevant for the discussion of the rights-principles divide as laid out in Article 52(5) 
CFR. Under this interpretation, where a rule possibly giving rise to a right is not sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional, it can give rise to individual rights only in view of norms further spec-
ifying the right to a degree which allows the finding of precise and unconditional rights. This 
interpretation is then in line with the general conceptualisation of rights arising from umbrella 
principles such as the rule of law or good administration, judiciable only through their more 
specific sub-concepts of, for example, the right to protection of legitimate expectations or the 
right to be heard respectively.100  
                                                 
99 Danish Supreme Court, decision n. 15/2014 of 6 December 2016. 
100 It may also be relevant to delineate the temporal scope, for instance where a right will depend on the expiration of trans-
position deadlines for directives. 
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Finally, the identification of an individual right has two consequences which highlight further 
elements of the concept of a right. One, an individual right has as a collateral, an obligation to 
protect that right effectively on public bodies under the principle of effectiveness and the right 
to an effective judicial remedy. 
The second consequence is that no right is absolute. This truism is of course applicable to any 
individual right. The approach which developed in western legal traditions in the post-war period 
to deal with the necessity of balancing of interests has been adjudicated through a two-step pro-
cess.101 The first step addresses ‘whether’ a right is granted by looking at the scope of protection. 
The second step establishes whether an infringement of the scope by means of limiting or over-
riding the right can be justified. The justification can lie in the necessity of balancing various 
rights against each other, but it can also be a limitation resulting from a public policy need not 
related to other individual rights. The rise of the principle of proportionality as tool of the judi-
ciary is a key element of proceduralising this very concept.102 What appears from this is that all 
rights, constitutional, fundamental or otherwise, are actually to be treated as ‘principles’ in the 
sense that they require, through a careful balancing exercise calibrated by the principle of pro-
portionality, to receive maximum recognition.103 
The concept of individual rights under EU law is thus a complex one, deeply integrated into the 
legal and philosophic frames of thought of the twentieth century and influenced by the need of 
ensuring effective enforcement of all interests protected by the law. Individuals, as would befit 
the notion of an individual in a pluralistic society, are key actors in the process of protecting these 
interests. EU law does not conscript individuals to defending only those narrow categories of 
rights explicitly assigned to them while requiring that only public actors act on behalf of a public 
interest. The broad and dynamic set of sources of rights is key to the developing EU legal system, 
where functional subjectivation simultaneously ensures the effectiveness of EU law and of indi-
vidual rights.  
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